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Introduction: 
The Capital One data leakage - as the latest instance of exploitation carried out by the 
actions of an insider threat - “involves the theft of more than 100 million customer records, 
140,000 Social Security numbers and 80,000 linked bank details of Capital One customers, 
allegedly stolen by a single insider, according to court filings in Seattle” (Kate Fazzini,  
CNBC).  Cybercrime continues to exhibit rising trends. According to a study provided by 
Ponemon Institute and Accenture, there was an 11% increase in the average annual number of 
security breaches in 2018 (Ponemon Institute LLC and Accenture, 2019).   
A data breach is an incident in which protected data has been accessed or disclosed in an 
unauthorized fashion. Those kinds of incidents can be caused by internal or external actors. 
Internal ones are either malicious or careless users. The external threat category includes 
hackers, cybercriminal organizations and state-sponsored actors. The data breaches that appear 
on the news are typically carried out by outsiders. Attacks coming from the outside generally 
expose threats that have been addressed with traditional security measures through a “defense 
in-depth” approach.  The hazards that originate from inside are more difficult to prevent and 
detect because insiders pose a high danger as they are familiar with the organization’s network 
topology, systems, directives, and policies, and they have access to confidential information 
with relatively low restrictions. When we analyze cybercrime, often we underestimate the 
dangers of the internal threat. Insiders present a significant risk to organizations and, even if 
they were not the most common source of attacks in past years, they were the most expensive 
and difficult to recover from.  
Definition 
 
There are two main types of insiders: malicious users (those that intentionally harm the 
institutions, as described above), and unintentional insider users (those that accidentally expose 
confidential data, as described below). These activities endanger confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the business.  
Different definitions of malicious insider threat could be found. The one from CERT 
US provides a comprehensive explanation. “A malicious insider threat, may be either a current 
or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a 
manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization's information or information systems” (The Cert Guide to Insider Threats, 2012). 
Motivators behind malicious insiders could include: monetary gain, a disgruntled employee, 
entitlement, ideology, or outside influence with the consequences of fraud, sabotage, espionage 
and theft or loss of confidential information. 
 The official working definition from the report “Unintentional Insider Threats: A 
Foundational Study” states that an unintentional insider threat is: “a current or former 
employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's 
network, system, or data and who, through action or inaction without malicious intent, causes 
harm or substantially increases the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems” (The Cert 
Guide to Insider Threats, 2013). 
Insider threats could be considered the biggest cybersecurity danger to firms, 
organizations and government agencies. According to the security company Clearswift, 
“Organizations report that 42% of IT security incidents occur as a result of their employees’ 
actions” (Clearswift, 2017). 
 
Current Concerns 
 
The dangers posed by insiders have multiple variables that must be considered when 
the risk is assessed. The following list provides an outline of the most important tasks that need 
to be addressed in order to be aware of the hazard introduced by internal actors. 
Firstly, an insider can easily bypass existing physical and technological security 
controls through legitimate rights. Employees, in fact, need to access the organization’s data 
for their daily tasks. Spotting the malicious activity is extremely difficult and time consuming. 
In addition, members of staff with technical knowledge can elude security controls currently 
in place. 
Another factor that needs to be considered is that technology alone is not enough. 
Controls can detect and block malevolent actions; however, if we want to prevent 
indiscriminate users, we need additional information. Human behaviour has a huge influence 
in comportment and sometimes can provide indications that help to identify a person’s further 
actions. Emerging techniques are focusing on sentiment analysis. Monitoring and identifying 
disgruntled employees could greatly increase chances of isolating promiscuous activity. 
 
In order to prevent malevolent activities, we need data from different controls. The 
availability of this information is often jeopardized within an entire organization and by being 
available to a different business owner. The difficulty is to have the approval of different 
stakeholders in order to have legal access to the data. Once these are aggregated, it is important 
to add correlation rules to the raw data so it can give us significant information to help our 
Security Operation Center (SOC) to be alerted in case of any infraction or suspicious behaviour. 
Safeguarding the privacy of the data in accordance with the law is mandatory for every 
firm and organisation. It is necessary that insider threat analysts follow laws regarding privacy, 
civil liberties, and legal guidance, including the General Data Protection Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2016).  
Preventing data leakage does not stop at the boundary of a firm’s network and it goes 
further beyond. The continued interaction with different business partners exposes systems to 
another threat. It is difficult to control the cyber security standards of affiliates. If not monitored 
properly, dishonest employees could use this as an entry point to an organization’s data and 
system, and misuse it. 
 
Types of Insider Activities 
 
A study conducted by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence 
(Kont, Pihelgas, Wojtkowiak, Trinberg, and Osula, 2015) categorizes threats into five mains  
different areas: 
 
1. Fraud - consisting of the use of the company’s information and data for personal 
gain.  
2. IT sabotage – which is a major and unpredictable action against the firm and could 
seriously impact the availability of the overall infrastructure.  
3. Intellectual property theft – which is a remunerative action that permits insiders to 
exfiltrate copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets without permission.  
4. Espionage - the practice of illegally obtaining information about the plans and 
activities from industrial or international government entities. 
5. Unintentional – employee that have not malevolent intent, although their actions, 
or behavior, occasionally affect the organization. 
Unintentional actors, as a result of carelessness, also can lead to a major security breach. 
This could cause as much damage as malevolent actions. Disclosure of classified information 
in the public domain and social media, accidentally replying to phishing campaigns, or 
downloading malicious code off the Internet are all examples of negligent activities that could 
have serious consequences for the organisation. A famous example within this category was 
the breach perpetrated on the American security company RSA in 2011. Four employees were 
targeted through a phishing email campaign, one of them clicked on the attachment that used 
a zero-day exploit, targeting a vulnerability. The intruders succeeded in exfiltrating confidential 
information related to the company’s SecurID two-factor authentication products (Zetter, 
2011). 
As technology grows and develops also malicious actors are constantly evolving and 
impacting our society. “Hacktivist” is a new threat category that was reported recently on the 
breaking news. The word “hacktivism” is relatively novel in the cyber domain. It combines the 
word “hacker” and “activist”. It consists of gaining unauthorized access to ICT systems and 
carrying out a variety of disruptive actions as a means of achieving political and social goals. 
In cases such as those of Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, thousands of classified 
documents were leaked, and a large amount of confidential information was revealed. Those 
incidents involve a number of distinct forms of cybercrimes: sabotage, espionage, intellectual 
property theft, and mark the difficulties of preventing a malicious actor from dispersing data 
even if sophisticated controls are in place (Ewen MacAskill, 2017).  
Proposed Remediation Guidelines 
 
To increase the chances of preventing, detecting and responding to insider threats, the 
overall security of the organisation must be well structured and organised.   
Every project needs executive-level managers leadership. In a company, a chief 
information security officer (CISO) must provide a long-term vision, engage with all 
departments, and finally promote and build a strong insider threat program (InTP). An effective 
InTP must include participation from different stakeholders. Mandatory departments that could 
contribute actively to the project are human resources, information assurance, legal, and cyber 
security.  
 
Best practices for an InTP should take into consideration at least the following areas in 
order to decrease the overall risk: administrative controls, technical controls, physical controls, 
security awareness and incident response.  
 
1- Administrative controls such as policies, directives and regulations must be clearly 
documented and enforced. It is important to show the acceptable use of an organisation’s 
system, network and information. It is relevant to remark what is expected from employees and 
also the possible consequences of violations. This is a valuable deterrence method.  
 
2 - Technical control is generally considered the backbone of every InTP. Data loss 
prevention, email monitoring, web proxy, rogue device detection, endpoint analytics, security 
information and event management (SIEM) are safeguards that can detect and prevent data 
leakage. In recent years, security has developed a new capability called User and Entity 
Behaviour Analytics (UEBA). This includes a behavioural analysis of entities, other than the 
users, such as routers, servers and endpoints. UEBA is much more effective since it can analyze 
the behaviour across multiple users and ICT devices in order to detect complex attacks. 
 
3 - Physical controls are also well-founded in assigning the least privilege i.e. only 
enough access to perform the required job and for implementing a segregation of duty when 
more than one person is required to complete a critical function.  Physical controls are also 
used to control and minimise the risk of unauthorised access to physical assets and information 
systems.  
 
4 - The employees in a company need to have security awareness training, with A 
specific chapter dedicated to insider threat in order to explain what is expected from them and, 
which threats they might be exposed to. Unintentional insider threat may be recruited from 
outside through the social engineering. It is important to make all employees acknowledgeable 
about such hazards and to train them how to avoid to be the weakness in the organisation’s 
security barrier. 
 
5 - Finally, the organisations must be ready to respond to an incident involving a 
malicious or unintentional insider threat. The incident response (IR) workflow should be part 
of an existing plan. However, the process should also include the escalation of the reporting, 
the notification to management, and submission to an investigation officer. 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Remediation Guidelines. 
 
 
Future Challenges 
 
A new challenge appeared in the recent years. This concerns the adoption of cloud and 
mobile technology in companies, and it transformed the IT infrastructures considerably. 
Physical boundaries of corporate networks and digital assets become less clearly defined than 
it used to be in the past. Therefore, new challenges are calling for new approaches.  
Since it is difficult to stop an insider threat at the boundary, early detection is the key. 
In modern ICT infrastructure, several technical controls are implemented and could identify 
suspicious activities such as unauthorised access, violation of organisation policies, internal 
reconnaissance, abuse of rights, and data loss. However, cyber security should not concern just 
technology. This approach can prevent and control the possible damage, but nowadays this 
approach it is not enough. It should be integrated with an additional layer. Guarding 
information and systems against insiders with illegitimate intentions requires a 
multidimensional defensive strategy.  
Analyzing user personalities through social media and combining the information with 
the technical domain could represent a dynamic approach to decrease the likelihood of such 
threats. Marwan Omar remarks: “Organizations need to implement multi layered defensive 
approaches to combat insider risks” (Marwan, 2015, p. 162).  
Nowadays, technical controls are already present in most organisations’ security 
programs. However, because of an increasingly threatening landscape, they cannot be solely 
relied upon. New technologies are periodically proposed, which potentially offer to the 
malicious employees new opportunities to strike. Using innovative know-how as a 
countermeasure should be the main priority.  
Technologies based on machine learning and artificial intelligence are to be 
implemented in order to assist with prevention and detection of insider threats before they are 
causing irreversible damage. The future development chapter of Cyber security has yet to be 
written, particularly with the coming power of quantum computers. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Insider threat employees represent the wolf in sheep's clothing. Daily, real examples, 
clearly show that insider threats create a significant hazard to every company, institution and 
organisation.  A potential malicious insider can cause millions of euro in damage by stealing 
intellectual property, sabotaging facilities or disclosing information that can irreparably 
compromise the organisation. However, an unintentional insider can cause irreversible damage 
as well. 
Enterprises will never be able to fully make sure that employees have no malicious 
intentions, or that they won't ever fall for phishing email campaigns. Meanwhile, although the 
elimination of all risks is not possible, the overall risks could be reduced and the residual risk 
controlled. Too often, the security strategy is dedicated to the edge security layer and ignores 
that a conspicuous threat might come within the organization.  
To conclude, defending your enterprise from insider threats is a vital part of information 
security best-practices. It is essential that your company’s highly valuable classified data and 
assets are protected from its greatest threat: the enemy within the gates. Every mature cyber 
security program nowadays should contain an insider threat assessment and a comprehensive 
insider threat program to protect a corporation’s people, facilities, networks, and intellectual 
property. 
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